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Multi-level Project Governance: Trends and Opportunities 
Abstract  
Project governance is important in ensuring successful project delivery. In this article we 
conduct a systematic investigation of previous research to provide a content-driven review of 
the literature, and to provide future research direction. We use the textual data mining 
software Leximancer to identify dominant concepts and themes underlying project 
governance research.!Our findings indicate that agency and stakeholder theories have been 
adapted to the project governance context to a greater extent than other theories. Furthermore, 
we find differences in project governance research, published in project management journals 
compared to general management, IT and engineering journals. We conclude the paper by 
presenting a framework that links governance theories to the multiple organizational levels 
relevant to project governance. 
1. Introduction 
The use of projects by organizations has evolved from simply being a tactical tool—for 
example, to manufacture products and service—towards becoming a strategic vehicle to 
transform organizations. Accordingly, much academic and practitioner attention has been 
dedicated to better understanding the management and governance of projects. Project 
management is mainly concerned with the operational control and execution of daily work at 
the project level (Turner, 2009), whereas project governance represents a higher-level 
structure; defining processes and structures to govern multiple projects and to manage 
strategic objectives (Nielsen, 2010). Previous studies have provided us with valuable insights 
into specific aspects of project management, such as leadership and performance outcomes 
(Turner, 2009). However, as the call for papers for this special issue on “Transforming 
Governance in Complex Project Environments” in the International Journal of Project 
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Management indicates, research has thus far devoted relatively less research attention on how 
to best govern projects. 
On its most basic level, project governance supports an organization in aligning its 
project objectives with its organizational strategy, achieving set project objectives and 
monitoring performance. It also describes the means for attaining such objectives (PMI, 2013, 
p. 579; Turner, 2009, p. 311). Project governance is an overarching business function in 
project-based organizations (PBOs) (PMI, 2013) and provides a framework for organizational 
processes, decision-making models and project management tools, which support the 
successful delivery of projects, programs and portfolios. It is thus closely linked to 
performance and represents a critical cornerstone of PBOs across multiple organizational 
layers, especially in complex projects (Garland, 2009). Governance research has started to 
acknowledge and address the particular nature of governance across the various relevant 
organizational levels (e.g., Foss et al., 2010). Due to the multiple definitions of project 
governance found in literature, the exact nature of the construct remains unclear. 
To provide structure and direction to existing and future research on project 
governance the specific aims of this paper are as follows. First, we identify and systematically 
review 97 papers published in major management (62 articles) and three project management 
(35 articles) journals, to explore the status of project governance research using unstructured 
ontological discovery (text mining). By so doing we explore the dominant content themes of 
project governance research. We also compare whether the content themes differ between 
research published in traditional management journals and dedicated project management 
journals. Second, we investigate how concepts and themes of dominant corporate governance 
theories (i.e., agency, stakeholder, stewardship and resource dependence theories, as well as 
transaction costs economics) have been applied to the context of project governance. Third, 
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we propose future research directions by presenting a framework with a particular focus on 
linking governance theories with the different levels of foci in project governance. 
Our study uses scholarly articles and thus, the words of contributors to the field, to 
scientometrically analyze project governance. We use the textual analysis tool Leximancer, as 
it is a powerful device for interpreting and visualizing complex text data (Campbell et al., 
2011). Leximancer investigates the co-occurrence of words within their textual contexts, 
which provides valuable insights for the narrative inquiry of the project management research 
field. The idea is that a word is defined by the context within which it occurs and words that 
co-occur reflect categories (i.e., concepts) with specific meaning. Based on the words of the 
authors, Leximancer enables us to identify concepts and themes in the field. Consequently, it 
is these text-derived concepts and themes that represent our level of analysis, rather than the 
article or author as used in other bibliometric techniques, such as co-citation analysis. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: we begin with a concise overview 
of the key theories that underlie corporate governance research; provide a short introduction 
to project governance research, as well as to the multi-level nature of PBOs, and we follow 
with an outline of our research methodology and data sets that constitute the basis for our 
detailed analysis of project governance research. Following the presentation of the 
Leximancer-derived results, we conclude this paper with a summary of our findings and 
provide avenues for future research through introducing a conceptual research framework, 
which discusses governance theories applied to the various organizational levels in PBOs. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 General governance theories 
Management scholars have drawn, and considerably adapted, ideas from policy research in 
political science to develop theories explaining the good governance of corporations (Bevir, 
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2010).1  In its most general form corporate governance is defined as the set of rules, 
(stakeholder) relationships, systems and processes by which authority is exercised and 
controlled in organizations. Corporate governance influences how organizational objectives 
are set and achieved (ASX, 2007; OECD, 2004) and also fosters self-regulation within a 
greater context, without determining every action of organizational actors (Clegg et al., 2002). 
Hence, “governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and 
collective action” (Stoker, 1998, p. 155). In what follows, we provide a concise overview of 
the dominant governance theories and summarize them in Table 1. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------ 
 
Agency theory Agency theory assumptions have been highly influential in shaping 
corporate governance systems and follow a ‘traditional’ finance and economics perspective 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory implies that the principal has difficulties in motivating the 
agent to act in the principal’s best interests. A common example is the separation of 
ownership and control, which is a fundamental problem in organizations (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This separation is the result of absent or distant owners/shareholders (i.e., 
principals), employing professional executives (i.e., agents) to act on their behalf (Eisenhardt, 
1989). As principals need to provide agents with some level of decision-making authority, 
issues related to conflict of interest and moral hazard, due to asymmetric information, may 
arise (Williamson, 1988). In line with neo-classical economics, the fundamental assumption 
underlying this theory is that an agent may be self-interested and act opportunistically, rather 
than purely in the interest of the principal/s (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Furthermore, 
agents and principals may differ in their risk attitudes (Eisenhardt, 1989). To mitigate these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Please see Bevir (2010) for more information on the difference of governance research in political science. 
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problems, the principal will incur 'agency costs' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These costs 
arise from the need to create outcome-based incentive systems that enable the alignment of 
agents’ and principals’ interests (e.g., performance-based contracts). Furthermore, costs arise 
from implementing monitoring and control mechanisms to govern agent behavior and to 
prevent agents’ abuse of principals’ interests. In the context of project management this 
theory is particularly used to describe the relationship between the owner of a project and its 
manager (Turner et al., 2010). 
Transaction cost economics Transaction cost economics (TCE) is concerned with the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior eventuating, which may be caused by organizational 
actions being driven by self-interest and an ambition to minimize costs (Williamson, 1979). In 
order to minimize the total costs of a good or service, different costs (e.g., production, search 
or information) must be taken into account before making a decision about suppliers, 
outsourcing, mergers and acquisitions, and any coordination between firms such as alliances 
or contractual agreements. TCE can, therefore, help to understand governance and 
organizational decision making. In its original form, Williamson (1975) outlines three drivers 
of transaction costs: (i) contingency factors (e.g., frequency and asset specificity); (ii) 
behavioral factors (e.g., bounded rationality and opportunism), and (iii) context (i.e., 
institutional context). An organization’s ability to control and/or decrease the impact of these 
factors—through contractual agreements, risk sharing or alliances—can minimize transaction 
costs and consequently determine an appropriate governance structure (Winch, 2001). In the 
project governance context, this theory may, for example, be used to describe the process of 
selecting contractors and suppliers (Winch, 2001). 
Stakeholder theory Stakeholder theory challenges agency assumptions about the 
primacy of shareholder interests and is based on a socially-oriented perspective (Jones and 
Wicks, 1999). It argues that a company should be managed in the interests of all its 
6 !
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers, local communities and the 
environment, as well as society at large (Blair, 1995). Stakeholder theory, therefore, suggests 
that conflicting interests and claims of different organizational stakeholders need to be 
balanced (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). These claims can range from purely financial 
objectives (e.g., return on investment) to corporate social performance measures (e.g., the 
organization’s attractiveness as an employer and its generation of goodwill). Meeting the 
interests of all stakeholders can be challenging, since social goals have the potential to 
constrain financial performance. Hence, the underlying governance mechanisms must find a 
way to balance this paradox. In stakeholder theory, performance depends on the 
organization’s understanding of: key business and competitive drivers; its capacities for 
strategic thought, and its communication and leadership skills in relation to all stakeholders. 
Following stakeholder theory, project governance is an essential strategy to assist project 
teams understand, and respond to, various stakeholder groups. 
Stewardship theory Stewardship theory provides an alternative description of human 
behavior compared to agency theory and is rooted in psychology and sociology. It assumes 
that not all human behavior is dictated by self-interest but that some organizational members 
(stewards) exhibit ‘pro-’ and collectivistic rather than individualistic and self-serving behavior 
(Davis et al., 1997). These stewards do not act in mere self-interest even where the interests of 
the steward and the principal are not aligned, which provides a basis for relational governance 
mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory argues that both parties have an interest 
in building and maximizing upon long-term and beneficial company relationships where 
motives and aims are well aligned between stewards and shareholders. More particularly, 
stewardship theory opposes agency theory as it assumes individuals perceive greater value in 
cooperative behavior (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). A steward believes that his or her value is 
increased and secured when the organization is performing well. Hence, stewards seek to 
improve organizational performance in order to ultimately improve their own situation. The 
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main concepts of stewardship theory are, therefore, identification, intrinsic motivation, long-
term involvement and trust (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory, applied to the context of 
project governance, proposes that shareholders would best be served by empowering project 
managers. 
Resource dependence theory Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Thompson, 2011) offers valuable insights into the allocation, prioritization and facilitation of 
organizational resources (Oliver, 1991), and suggests that organizational success depends on 
the organization’s ability to control interdependent external and internal resources (Clarke, 
2004). A firm’s resource base provides crucial connection points when organizations engage 
in exchanges and transactions, and thus plays a vital role in achieving organizational success 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Resources can take a variety of forms all of which can be argued 
to add to the 'capital' of a company. The variety of available resources (including human 
resources) can be unique to an organization, and in turn, affect its organizational governance 
structure (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory allows us to think of the 
varied needs that organizations have at different stages of their life cycle and how resources 
can be used to overcome organizational challenges. Simply put, resource dependence theory 
views resources as the main driver of an organization’s governance structure. Consequently, 
this governance theory may help to understand the importance of allocating and prioritizing 
different resources that are often shared across project programs and portfolios. 
The corporate governance literature has acknowledged the plurality of theoretical 
governance frameworks (Clarke, 2004). Existing corporate governance theories are context 
dependent, not universally applicable and can be applied to project governance in particular 
contexts, settings or situations. Although some authors argue for the convergence of existing 
governance theories (Roe, 2003), we believe that keeping the plurality and differences of 
existing governance theories is more beneficial, as it enables us to specifically account for the 
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distinct needs across organizational levels, projects, programs and portfolios to ensure 
successful project governance. 
 
2.2 Overview of project governance research 
Several definitions of project governance exist (Table 2) and they each share the views that 
project governance is primarily concerned with aligning project objectives with an 
overarching organizational strategy, and that it is necessary to create stakeholder benefits 
across different organizational levels. In general, project governance is concerned with 
consistently delivering successful and satisfactory projects, and programs, in regards to “their 
planned contribution to corporate strategy and stakeholder expectations” (Müller, 2009, p. 
16). Projects are embedded across multiple organizational contexts (Sydow et al., 2004). 
Hence, in order to achieve organizational and project objectives, conceptualizations of project 
governance need to take into account this multi-level nature, which occurs at the intersections 
of projects, programs, and project portfolios. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------ 
 
Moreover, projects are used as the main vehicle to achieve strategic objectives and 
beneficial change (Turner, 2006). To allow for repeatable, effective and successful 
completion of projects and organizational objectives, project-based organizations (PBOs) 
often use formal organizational governance processes and mechanisms. These mechanisms 
might be different across different layers within PBOs, since the specific objectives at each 
level may be distinct (Söderlund, 2011; Turner et al., 2010). Despite possible differences, 
governance frameworks implemented at different organizational layers cannot be seen as 
independent operating systems. They are interrelated across the different layers of the PBO 
and, for example, a higher-level governance structure can impose constraints on a lower 
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organizational level. This is particularly the case when a PBO is subject to strict 
organizational governance. It is therefore important to account for the multi-level nature of 
PBOs and briefly outline the characteristics of governance across different organizational 
layers within the PBO. 
To obtain an understanding of the status of the current project governance literature 
we investigated management and project management literature, using Leximancer, a textual 
analysis tool. This enabled us to inductively identify which governance theories were most 
widely used across the literature. In the following section we provide an overview of the 
dataset and describe our methods in further detail. 
3. Research Methods  
3.1 Data 
Project management has gained interest from a wide range of disciplines, including 
engineering, information technology, research and development, and management (Figure 1). 
We focused on academic journals because, while novel research may be published in books 
and conference proceedings, journals remain the premium outlet for research aimed at 
scholarly advancement (Hällgren, 2012; Pfeffer, 2007). Articles on project management 
related topics were found in journals ranging from broader management and organization 
studies (e.g., Academy of Management Journal, Organization Studies), to project 
management-specific outlets (e.g., International Journal of Project Management). We used 
the Scopus database to identify papers that deal with project governance. To achieve the most 
relevant sample of project governance-related articles—published in management, 
engineering, IT, science and decision science journals—we only downloaded articles that 
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used the term ‘project governance’ in their title, abstract and/or keywords. This search 
resulted in 87 papers out of which we had access to 62 articles.2 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------!
 
In a second step, we downloaded another set of articles on project governance, which 
were published in the major project management-specific journals (i.e., International Journal 
of Project Management (IJPM), Project Management Journal (PMJ)), to compare 
governance-specific literature to general project management literature. The related journals 
represent the current formalized, discipline-specific theoretical knowledge base. To compile 
the most representative sample we searched for the term ‘governance’ in the title, abstract, 
and/or keywords, as articles published in dedicated project management journals deal with 
projects by their very nature. Our search resulted in 44 papers out of which we had access to 
35 articles.3 Table 3 provides a summary of the project management-specific papers. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 here 
------------------------------ 
 
3.2 Method  
To systematically review existing research on project management, we used the textual 
analysis tool Leximancer, as it is a powerful means of interpreting and visualizing complex 
text data (Campbell et al., 2011). Unlike the more common co-citation analysis, which uses 
the links between authors rather than key constructs as the primary unit of analysis, our 
primary interest was to uncover the links between constructs that are used within the project 
management research stream. The co-citation analysis method is aimed at determining the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The remaining papers were either forthcoming or not available online. We also excluded all literature from 
project management-specific journals (e.g., IJPM, PMJ) as they are part of the second analysis. 
3"The remaining papers were either forthcoming or not available online."
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subject similarity between articles, based on the logic that when articles are published within 
a particular research stream, they are assumed to address similar topics (White and Griffith, 
1981). In our study, we investigated the co-occurrence of words within their textual contexts, 
which provides valuable insights for the narrative inquiry of the project management and 
governance research fields. The rationale for this assumes that a word is defined by the 
context within which it occurs, and words that co-occur reflect categories (i.e., concepts) with 
specific meanings. We perform unstructured ontological discovery using Leximancer 4.0 
(www.leximancer.com). Leximancer enabled us to review the actual words of authors and, 
thus, to identify concepts and themes emerging from existing literature. Consequently, it is 
such text-derived concepts and themes that represent our level of analysis, rather than the 
article or author as used in other bibliometric techniques, such as co-citation analysis. 
Leximancer has successfully been used in similar research contexts to scientometrically 
describe and analyze text (e.g. Dann, 2010; Liesch et al., 2011), for example: decomposing 
the international business field (Liesch et al., 2011); corporate risk management (Martin and 
Rice, 2007); tourism (Scott and Smith, 2005), and behavioral research (Smith and 
Humphreys, 2006). 
Leximancer runs both conceptual and relational analyses of textual data and then 
provides visual representations of these analyses. Thus, it allows researchers to examine 
concepts (i.e., common text elements) and themes (i.e., groupings of uncovered concepts) 
used by other scholars (Mathies and Burford, 2011). To do so, a machine-learning algorithm 
is applied to uncover the main concepts used in text and how they relate to each other 
(Campbell et al., 2011). Leximancer-derived concept identification exhibits high face validity, 
that is, close agreement with expert judgment (Rooney, 2005). Additionally, the program is 
appropriate for exploratory research as it produces high reliability and reproducibility of 
concept extractions and thematic clustering, without facing some of the possible biases that 
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are characteristic of manually coded text analyses techniques (Baldauf and Kaplan, 2011; 
Dann, 2010; Smith and Humphreys, 2006). 
The maps of meaning (Figures 2-3) are derived by the Leximancer software, based on the 
frequency counts of individual concepts and their proximity to each other within text. 
Leximancer initially creates a thesaurus of words that are closely related to a concept (refer to 
dots in Figures 2-3) to define its content. Leximancer’s derived concepts are collections of 
words that carry related meaning/s (Campbell et al., 2011). Relationships between concepts 
are then identified and aggregated into themes (refer to circles in Figures 2-3)4. The 
importance of themes is expressed by the color of the circles (brighter circles are more 
important) and circle size (the size indicates how many concepts have been clustered 
together). The distance between concepts on the ‘maps of meaning’ show how closely the 
concepts are related. Therefore, concepts that are weakly related, semantically, will be 
mapped far apart (Campbell et al., 2011; Rooney, 2005). When concepts and themes appear 
close together within the textual data, they will be clustered close together or even overlap in 
the map (Campbell et al., 2011). 
The algorithm applied by Leximancer is Bayesian, and based on its Bayesian logic the 
software is capable of automatically and efficiently learning that words forming a sentence 
predict emerging concepts. This can be achieved across a great number of concepts and a 
large corpus of text. Concepts are defined in advance by using only a small number of seed 
words. As numerous trials have shown, Leximancer’s automatic selection of key concepts and 
themes within text data exhibits good agreement with expert judgments (Campbell et al., 
2011; Rooney, 2005). In the proceeding section we illustrate our analysis and report on 
results. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 We deleted words such as ‘authors’, ‘example’, ‘use’, etc. from the text so as to not bias the creation of 
concepts and themes. 
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4. Results and analysis 
Our research depicts the nature of project governance research, based on the words of the 
authors who are active in the field of project management. The analysis of the data is outlined 
below. First, we analyzed the 62 articles across the 21 non-project management-specific 
journals, which include the terms ‘project governance’ in their title, keywords and/or abstract. 
We then focused our analysis on 34 articles that include the search term ‘governance’ and 
were published in leading project management journals. In the following section we present 
the main findings from our data analysis. 
4.1 Project governance in non-project management literature 
The results of the textual analysis of the 62 papers, of the first dataset (Figure 2), show that 
‘governance’ and ‘project’ are the most central and dominant themes in previous research 
(depicted by bright colors). When looking at the concepts (black dots), which form the 
Leximancer-derived governance theme, in more detail we find that ‘structure’, ‘process’ and 
‘role’ are closely related, indicating that the general objective of project governance is to 
propose a framework that combines processes, roles and accountabilities aimed at delivering 
projects. Moreover, we find that ‘level’ appears as a concept within the governance theme, 
indicating that project governance issues are discussed in relation to different levels in the 
governance literature. 
The ‘project’ theme comprises concepts, such as ‘success’, ‘business’, ‘management’, 
‘change’ and ‘implementation’. These concepts indicate an understanding of projects as 
vehicles in organizations that can implement change (Cicmil, 1999). This particular 
perception of projects is primarily used in the general management literature—as projects are 
considered to be parts within a greater organizational structure and not as self-sufficient 
organizational entities (e.g., temporary organizations) that possess their own organizational 
identity. The ‘management’ concept indicates a distinct focus on project management, as 
‘management’ is part of the ‘project’ theme. ‘Governance’ appears as an independent theme 
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and is in close proximity to the concepts of ‘project’ and ‘organization’. This relationship 
supports our argument for the multi-level nature of project governance, which provides an 
organizational structure across different organizational layers. Project management, in 
contrast, deals predominantly with the tactical, daily activities of delivering successful 
projects, and is thus situated on a lower level, such as the project (O'leary et al., 2011). 
------------------------------ 




There is great overlap of the ‘governance’ and ‘control’ themes, indicating that 
concepts relating to these themes are frequently mentioned together within articles. This 
reinforces the traditional perception of governance as an organizational tool for monitoring 
and controlling managerial actions (Garland, 2009). Interestingly, the terms ‘mechanism’ and 
‘performance’ form part of the ‘control’ theme, rather than the ‘governance’ theme, and 
therefore shows a strong relationship between performance and control. Control mechanisms, 
to manage and govern projects on a higher level, have been proposed by governance scholars 
(e.g., Müller 2009, Davis et al. 1997) as a means of creating visibility and transferability of 
organizational practices across different organizational layers and departments. We also find 
the concepts of ‘contract’ and ‘formal’ (together with the performance measures of ‘cost’ and 
‘quality’) in the ‘control’ theme. The interplay between contracts and performance is an 
underlying feature of agency theory, which describes contracts as a mechanism for effectively 
delivering projects, as they regulate the potential misalignment of interests and trust between 
principals and agents. 
 The ‘knowledge’ theme and its overlap with the ‘governance’ theme show the 
relevance of knowledge for PBOs. For example, previous research has investigated the 
governance of knowledge creation and dissemination in inter-organizational projects (Bosch-
Sijtsema and Postma, 2010). Sydow et al. (2004) further point out that ‘knowledge’ in a PBO 
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context is relevant within project teams, between project teams, at the organizational and 
inter-organizational levels. This is supported by our Leximancer analysis (see Figure 2), as 
the ‘knowledge’ theme comprises concepts such as ‘actors’, ‘network’, ‘market’ and 
‘organizations’, which describe the organizational context in which knowledge is discussed. 
This suggests a research focus on the various levels of analysis relevant to project 
governance. As stated above, governance can occur on multiple organizational levels, but is 
mainly set out on a higher organizational level to ensure successful project delivery. These 
indicate a focus on structural (e.g., network) and non-structural (e.g., activities) issues. This 
dual focus implies a more holistic view that challenges the traditional notion of organizations 
as rational constructs—a perspective that, with the emergence of alternative management and 
project studies, has gained prominence over the last decade (e.g. Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006; 
2008). 
The ‘resource’ theme is also in close proximity to the ‘governance’ theme. The 
facilitation, prioritization and allocation of organizational resources are three mechanisms that 
underpin good project governance (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006). This importance of 
resources is specifically supported by the resource dependency theory, a corporate governance 
theory that is entirely concerned with organizational resources and their imperative 
contribution to organizational and project success. Moreover, project governance and project 
management have been described as being primarily concerned with organizational processes 
(e.g., best practices) and the human ability to apply such processes to the delivery of 
successful outcomes. In other words, projects are mainly driven by people, that is, their 
intellectual capacity and individual development, and their selection of appropriate modes of 
doing. This highlights the existence of a variety of resources, such as human and technical, all 
of which require to be integrated when delivering a successful project (Müller, 2009). Hence, 
an important aspect of delivering a successful project is the facilitation and allocation of 
existing organizational resources, particularly across project programs and portfolios. As 
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Turner and Keegan (2001) outline, there are also examples of project managers being 
evaluated on their resource utilization rather their profit generation. This becomes 
increasingly important, and problematic, in large and complex projects where projects share 
common resource pools—both physical and human—and the level of uncertainty is 
exponentially higher. 
The ‘community’ and ‘social’ themes illustrate the importance of contextual and 
environmental factors that enable, but also restrict, the successful delivery of projects and 
programs (Müller, 2009). These themes focus on the social and behavioral aspects of project 
governance, and the context in which projects are delivered. This is highlighted by concepts 
such as ‘people’, ‘social’, ‘politics’ and ’power’. The term ‘relational governance’ is often 
used to describe this form of governance, in which arrangements based on trust complement 
complex contracts (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Hence, relational governance and the concepts 
outlined in the ‘community’ and ‘social’ themes describe the importance of the behavioral 
aspect of projects, emphasizing non-technical aspects (Pollack, 2007). Behavioral aspects 
have gained prominence over the last decade, with the emergence of critical project studies 
(Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006; 2008), where the focus is on relationship and interpersonal 
relations, such as relational contracts which are based on trust and a collaborative mind set 
regarding shared risk and reward (Baker et al., 2002). The concept of ‘community’ implies a 
more holistic view that stretches across levels, which is particularly relevant in the context of 
project governance (Piattoni, 2010). This theme further demonstrates that ‘participation’ is an 
underlying concept that indicates a need to involve stakeholders—as well as encourage their 
active participation—by expressing expectations, discussing and correcting requirements, and 
iteratively working towards successful outcomes (London and Siva, 2011). 
The ‘planning’ theme represents the context in which project governance has been 
researched. Planning, as a managerial action, is a vital component of many governance 
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frameworks and their quest for rigorous planning and control mechanisms, and could thus be 
expected to appear closer to concepts such as ‘control’, ‘mechanisms’, or ‘framework’. 
Interestingly, urban planning projects seem to be a prominent context in which project 
governance has been investigated. The proximity of the concepts ‘urban’ and ‘planning’ 
provides the basis for this argument. The appearance of the concepts ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
indicates that both types of projects were used for empirical evidence, in addition to there 
being a particular focus on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) within the governance context 
(e.g., IJPM 2006, Issue 24). 
In summary, our analysis of the general management literature indicates that agency 
theory plays a prominent role in describing project governance. Moreover, resources emerge 
as a dominant theme in the governance literature, indicating a link to resource dependence 
governance theory. Moreover, we argue that the existence of social aspects in combination 
with the ‘community’ theme indicates a particular focus of behavioral governance theories 
(e.g., stakeholder theory), despite the fact that the term ‘stakeholder’ does not specifically 
appear in our results. In the following section, we will investigate project governance-related 
articles in project management-specific journals, to clarify whether different theories and 
contexts are used to conceptualize project governance. 
4.2 Project governance in project management literature 
In a second analysis step we focused on 35 articles that were published in dedicated project 
management journals (Figure 3). Overall, the results show a strong research focus on the 
themes of ‘project’ and ‘management’ (bright colors). ‘Governance’ is only a concept within 
‘management’. The ‘project’ and ‘management’ themes are the most dominant themes and 
indicate that projects have mainly been discussed together with concepts such as ‘change’, 
‘information’, ‘governance’, ‘stakeholders’, ‘strategy’ and ‘performance’. Performance has 
traditionally been associated with good project management and governance (Turner, 2009), 
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which is highlighted by the existence of the concept ‘performance’, but also by its proximity 
to the concept of ‘governance’.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
------------------------------ 
 
The large overlap of ‘project’ with the theme of ‘development’, which includes ‘value’ 
as an individual concept, highlights the inclusion of performance measures beyond the 
traditional iron triangle (Atkinson, 1999)—a crucial aspect of stakeholder theory. The purpose 
of stakeholder governance is to provide value for all stakeholders (Clarke, 2004), which 
transcends the more narrow view of shareholder theory. Stakeholder theory argues that 
organizational and project objectives (e.g., financial, growth and social performance) must be 
developed by “balancing the interests and claims of different stakeholders, such as managers, 
employees, suppliers and the wider society” (Müller, 2009, p. 5). The ‘development’ theme is 
further comprised by the concepts ‘system’, ‘support’ and ‘structure’, which are also in close 
proximity to the concepts ‘governance’ and ‘management’, and thus emphasize the 
importance of developing an organizational governance structure that aims to support the 
daily management of projects, programs and portfolios. 
The concepts ‘change’ and ‘strategic’, within the ‘project’ and ‘management’ themes, 
indicate a particular focus on strategic issues in which projects are seen as vehicles of change 
that enable organizations to achieve their strategic objectives (Artto et al., 2008). 
Traditionally, strategy has been discussed as a higher-level concept, but the increasing size 
and complexity of projects requires that projects themselves also be set up strategically (Artto 
et al., 2008). Hence, project strategy is a dual level phenomenon that, in different contexts, is 
characterized by the strategy of a project-based parent organization or several strong 
stakeholders, and different degrees of project independence in which projects have a 
particular strategic focus of their own. 
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Moreover, the ‘management’ theme specifically comprises concepts such as 
‘stakeholder’ and ‘manager’, indicating a general relationship between project governance 
and management, as governance structures position different roles, processes and 
accountabilities in place. Governance frameworks provide the boundaries and rules in which 
the project-level actor (e.g., project manager) can freely act to produce value for the various 
stakeholders. The importance of ‘stakeholder’ indicates a particular importance of behavioral 
aspects in project management, as suggested by the stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory 
conceptualizes organizations as a system of stakeholders, across multiple levels and with 
multiple degrees of involvement. That is, stakeholders may include shareholders, the wider 
society, organizational actors and other beneficiaries. Although some managers only focus on 
a narrow group of key stakeholders, others focus on a wide array of stakeholders, including 
the public (e.g., corporate social responsibility). Stakeholder theory, therefore, aims to enable 
coordination of information and activities between different stakeholders in order to create 
value for all the relevant parties (Müller, 2009). 
Governance is a multi-level phenomenon that facilitates interactions between 
organizational actors within and across organizational levels. Trust plays a critical role in 
governance literature with regards to managing the relationships between various actors 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). This connection is illustrated by the concepts ‘trust’ and 
‘relationship’ within the ‘actors’ theme, which are of particular interest in agency and 
stewardship theory (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). While both governance theories approach 
the concept of ‘relationship’ differently, they both outline the common goal of delivering a 
beneficial outcome for stakeholders (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Agency theory, on the 
other hand, achieves this via physical contracts while stewardship theory argues that relational 
governance is the key to success, as “relational exchanges persist over time to yield enhanced 
rents for both partners” (Singh and Sirdeshmukh, 2000, p. 153). 
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Similar to the content of the ‘knowledge’ theme in our analysis of project governance 
in non-project management literature (see Figure 2), the ‘organizations’ theme acknowledges 
a higher organizational level that defines the organizational frame in which project 
governance takes place. This higher organizational level is more concerned with 
organizational structures (i.e., ‘process’ and ‘practices’), the larger context and its 
characteristics (i.e., ‘complex’ and ‘environment’), as well as the continuous improvement of 
existing organizational capabilities (i.e., ‘learning’ and ‘knowledge’). For instance, Pemsel 
and Muller (Pemsel and Müller, 2012) investigated knowledge governance practices and 
show that governance mechanisms impact knowledge creation in PBOs.  
The ‘construction’ and ‘public’ themes generally describe the research contexts in 
which project governance research takes place (e.g., public and private sectors, government 
and the investment sector). Furthermore, the concept of ‘contracts’ appears in the 
‘construction’ theme and is in proximity to concepts such as ‘client’, ‘cost’ and ‘time’, which 
indicates that contracts are primarily used in combination with performance measures. 
Performance-based contracts are directly related to agency theory and transaction cost 
economics, both of which have traditionally been used to explain the governance of projects 
(e.g., Söderlund, 2011; Turner and Keegan, 2001; Winch, 2001), in a construction context that 
is primarily driven by engineering-based approaches to project management. 
 Moreover, ‘risk’ appears as a concept within the ‘public’ theme and illustrates that 
project management journals have discussed project governance to a large extent in the 
context of risk, as governance structures are particularly necessary in risky and more complex 
projects (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006). These types of projects (e.g., megaprojects) require 
sophisticated governance mechanisms that manage and control projects while meeting the 
expectations of various stakeholders (Aaltonen and Sivonen, 2009). For example, an efficient 
governance structure provides a structure in which badly performing projects are highlighted 
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and early warning signs trigger an alert mechanism. Hence, risk management is a key aspect 
of project governance, and therefore, in close proximity to the concept of ‘performance’. 
Furthermore, ‘risk’ is a common theme in agency theory, specifically with regards to the 
potentially different attitudes towards risk between principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
5. Discussion  
Our analysis of extant literature illustrates that research on project governance, in 
management journals and project management journals, reveal a variety of concepts and 
themes underlying existing governance theories. One major finding is that project governance 
research in broader management, engineering and IT journals specifically deals with the 
concept of governance, whereas project management journals are more concerned with the 
aspect of project management. Furthermore, we find that not all existing governance theories 
have been applied to the project governance context, or if they have, not to the same extent. 
While both sets of journals contain a variety of governance theories, resource dependence 
theory appears to only have had a major influence on research in non-project management 
journals. Furthermore, concepts such as ‘organization’, ‘project’, ‘manager’ and ‘level’ 
indicate that project governance is a multi-level phenomenon. Additionally, concepts such as 
‘roles’, ‘actor’, ‘contract’ and ‘relationship’ suggest that project governance is an 
organizational control mechanism, which uses formal and informal structures, to govern 
accountabilities and responsibilities across different organizational levels, both internally and 
externally (e.g., ‘contractors’ and ‘clients’). 
Some of the confusion around project governance research may have arisen due to 
researchers attempting to apply various governance theories in order to find a single solution 
to the problem of project governance. However, the findings from the textual analysis indicate 
that project governance is a multi-level phenomenon. That is, that different levels of analysis 
require different governance models and underlying mechanisms rely heavily on assumptions 
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about the organizational context, as well as the nature of projects and the way in which 
projects operate (O'Leary, 2012). Therefore, in the remainder of this paper we present a 
conceptual framework, structured around the different levels of governance, that provides 
suggestions regarding how existing governance theories may best be applied to the context of 
project governance (Table 4). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 here 
------------------------------ 
 
5.1 Level of project 
At the individual project level, project governance is mainly concerned with ensuring that 
“projects are undertaken in the right way to deliver the right products, and to ensure the 
products will deliver the desired benefits” (Turner et al., 2010, p. 112). Project governance is, 
therefore, closely related to project management by setting the overarching frame in which the 
management of projects occur (PMI, 2013). This frame comprises several governance 
mechanisms imposed by higher project based organization PBO levels (Müller et al., 2013), 
such as structural control and planning mechanisms, and relational mechanisms—such as trust 
and empowerment (Zaheer et al., 1998). Project governance on a project level has a direct 
effect on project management and the delivery of project-specific objectives to a broader set 
of stakeholders (Bredillet, 2008c). Project management is thus a component of project 
governance at the project level that deals with the operational control and execution of the 
daily project work on the project level (Turner, 2009). In other words, project management is 
primarily concerned with meeting the tactical objectives of a particular project (PMI, 2013). 
Successful projects contribute to the broader strategic goals on a program or portfolio level of 
the PBO (Williams and Samset, 2012). 
!
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At the project level, the main objectives and performance measures are rather short 
term and goal oriented, aligned with the nature of the particular project. In this context, 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory are useful frameworks to explain and 
analyze project governance, at the project level, which is also supported by our analysis of the 
project management-specific journals. Both theories are well aligned with the needs and 
nature of an individual project. For example, TCE research in project management may 
explore the impact of transaction costs (Williamson, 1998; 1979) and costs of alternative 
forms of contracting. The total costs are the sum of the actual production cost (i.e., rate of the 
contractor), in combination with the cost of governing the transactions implicit in that choice 
of production technique (i.e., overall product provided by contractor). A particular production 
technique that has the lowest production costs might, therefore, not be the economizing 
choice if transaction costs are also considered (Winch, 2001). Project management literature 
has primarily used construction projects to investigate this type of governance (Winch, 2001) 
and the effects that TCE has on the underlying roles and responsibilities in projects (Turner 
and Keegan, 2001). 
 Moreover, agency theory in project management investigates the interplay between 
projects and the external environment, such as project managers and project owners, 
specifically with regards to goal preferences and information asymmetry (Söderlund, 2011). 
Agency theory assumes that behavior belongs to that of a rational actor who acts in a self-
serving and self-interested way (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To protect the organization’s 
(i.e., shareholder’s) interests, agency theorists prescribe various governance mechanisms to 
align agent behavior with the interests of principal/s (Davis et al., 1997). For example project 
owners may keep potentially self-serving project managers in line by performing project 
audits and performance evaluations. These controlling governance mechanisms are installed 
due to the underlying assumption that the agent (i.e., project manager) will act in a self-
interested fashion in order to maximize his or her individual utility, at the expense of the 
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principal's utility (Davis et al., 1997). Due to the prominent nature of projects as temporary 
organizations, which imply short-term and goal-oriented mind sets, it is not surprising that 
agency theory and TCE are perceived as the dominant governance streams across project 
management literature. 
 
5.2 Level that links parent organization to project (e.g., PMO) 
At this middle level within PBOs, project governance has the main task of linking corporate 
governance to the governance of a particular project, and is concerned with two key issues: (i) 
defining the objectives of projects, program and portfolios, and (ii) defining the project 
management capabilities by which the projects are delivered (Turner et al., 2010). This level 
is often represented by a project management office (PMO), which is defined as an  
“organizational structure that standardizes the project-related governance processes and 
facilitates the sharing of resources, methodologies, tools, and techniques“ (PMI, 2013, p. 
580). Hence, the PMO level is an intermediate organizational structure that is gaining 
prominence in the project-based environment, due to the need of aligning projects, programs 
and portfolios with the strategic objectives at the corporate level (Artto et al., 2011; Aubry et 
al., 2013; Aubry et al., 2011). Moreover, PMOs aim to build, develop and continuously 
improve project management capabilities and thus increase the maturity of project 
management in general (Aubry et al., 2011). This further involves tracking and evaluating 
projects, and allocating and prioritising resources to ensure that “organizational capabilities 
and competencies are developed to enable projects, programs and portfolios to thrive” (Turner 
et al., 2010, p. 112). 
In PBOs, projects should not be regarded as a series of isolated tasks, but rather as 
embedded in a mutual, resource dependent system of multiple projects with more or less 
enduring social relationships (Engwall, 2003; Eskerod, 1996). Projects are never fully self-
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contained, and it is therefore crucial to acquire and prioritize resources, such as money, staff 
or specific assets, across different—yet interdependent—projects. Often, there are imbalances 
in the distribution of resources as well as interdependencies among projects within a PBO, 
which makes project governance complex (Jensen et al., 2006). Resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 2011) may offer project governance researchers 
valuable tools with which to analyze the allocation, prioritization and facilitation of 
organizational resources (Oliver, 1991). One of the main problems for projects is how to 
manage complexity and deliver projects successfully (Thompson, 2011). In other words, 
“without a governance structure, an organization runs the risk of conflicts and inconsistencies 
between various means of achieving organizational goals, the processes and resources, 
thereby causing costly inefficiencies that impact negatively on both smooth running and 
bottom line profitability” (Müller, 2009, p. 2). A solid governance structure, following the 
logic of resource dependence theory, can help organizations in act strategically in their 
environment, manage their projects and buffer external and internal influences, when 
choosing between different interactive strategies to manage projects in a complex 
environment (Jensen et al., 2006). These strategies are applicable to both permanent and 
temporary organizations, and apply across different organizational levels (Jensen et al., 2006). 
5.3 Level of parent organization (corporate governance) 
At the level of the parent organization, the highest project-relevant level, project governance 
has been described as corporate governance for project based organizations (PBOs) that 
“defines the objectives of the company, and initiates project, program and portfolio 
management as the means of obtaining corporate objectives and monitoring progress” (Turner 
et al., 2010, p. 112). Performance and performance objectives are of a strategic nature, and 
primarily concerned with long-term effects and the PBO’s competitiveness, including its 
impact on society, benefits for external stakeholders or shareholders, and the sustainability of 
the projects that it undertakes (Williams and Samset, 2012). At this level, project governance 
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is generally concerned with collecting timely, relevant and reliable reports about project 
portfolios, in order to provide senior management and board executives with information that 
will support their decision-making processes on a higher PBO level—as an “efficient 
reporting process will minimize the reporting burden throughout the organization without 
compromising effectiveness” (APM, 2012, p. 11). 
We argue that stakeholder theory and stewardship theory are well suited to 
conceptualize project governance and its characteristics at this higher organizational level 
(i.e., long-term orientation and strategic performance). Stakeholder theory evolved around the 
assumption that organizations have responsibilities towards external and internal stakeholder 
groups. Stakeholders are any “identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement 
of an organization’s objectives, or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
objectives” (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p. 91). Stakeholder theory allows researchers to use a 
relational approach to project governance, which aims to explain how organizations can 
prioritize and manage relations with identified stakeholders (Mason et al., 2007). Issues 
around organizational well-being, organizational ethics, sustainability and corporate social 
responsibility are, therefore, major concerns of the stakeholder theory of project governance. 
Due to the nature and set-up of many project-based organizations, this type of governance is 
typically found at higher PBO levels (e.g., corporate level and project management office 
(PMO) level), where managers deal directly with a broad set of stakeholders (Blomquist and 
Müller, 2006). 
Stewardship theory is also aligned with the objectives of a higher PBO level. The 
stewardship theory of project governance stands in contrast to the view of agency theory in 
that it transcends the rational, self-interested and economic interpretation of relationships 
within an organization (Davis et al., 1997). In other words, stewardship theory of project 
governance assumes that project managers (or stewards) act in the best interest of the PBO 
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and the project sponsor (Davis et al., 1997). The underlying motives of delivering successful 
projects, therefore, include trust, identification with the particular project, its outcome/s, and 
the general culture of the PBO. In the project management literature, the concept of stewards 
(e.g., project managers and program managers) has been used to describe organizational 
actors that act in the best interest of principals (e.g. board members and the project sponsor), 
in order to progress the strategic goals of the PBO and its stakeholders (Turner and Keegan, 
2001). In line with the multi-level nature of project governance in PBOs, this view portrays a 
higher-level form of governance, in which trust, mutual benefits and strategic objectives are 
the main drivers of governance. In other words, “there must be a culture of trust between the 
principal (or primary stakeholder) and managers to support this approach” (Mason et al., 
2007, p. 290). Stewardship theory of project governance suggests that project sponsors and 
owners trust and empower project (or program/portfolio) managers, to act in the best interest 
of the PBO and deliver successful projects. 
6. Conclusion and future research 
 
The growing number of project governance-related papers indicates that project governance is 
an increasingly important topic (Figure 1). Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide a 
systematic review of project governance in major management and project management 
journals, and to investigate how concepts and themes of dominant corporate governance 
theories have been applied to the context of project based organizations (PBOs) as multi-level 
structures. We find that there are a number of specific themes and concepts that suggest the 
application of corporate governance theories to the project context, such as ‘cost’ (i.e., 
transaction cost economics (TCE)), ‘trust’ (i.e., stewardship theory) or ‘control’ (i.e., principal 
agency theory). Other concepts, such as ‘strategic’, ‘contracts’ or ‘roles’, are in line with the 
general aim of project governance, which is to align project objectives with the strategy of the 
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larger organization, via the project sponsor and project team, and through organizational 
structures and mechanisms. However, our analysis fails to reveal specific governance-related 
roles, such as shareholder, principal, agent, project sponsor or owner, or steward. 
In line with existing research on project governance (Bredillet, 2008b; Söderlund, 
2011), we further find that the main empirical context of project governance is construction 
(e.g., Turner and Keegan, 2001; Winch, 2001). We therefore suggest that additional research 
contexts are needed to progress project governance research. To enhance our understanding of 
project governance, it would be particularly interesting to include contexts in which projects 
are more transient, more agile and, therefore, less driven by structured approaches. A focus on 
information technology companies, particularly in the area of software development, will 
certainly help to further validate the concept of project governance—since project governance 
is always subject to context-specific requirements (O'Leary and Williams, 2012). 
Furthermore, in line with the Governance School of project management (Bredillet, 
2007; Söderlund, 2004) our findings highlight three particular areas of previous research 
interest: (i) transaction costs associated with projects; (ii) the principal agency relationship 
between client and contractor, and (iii) general mechanisms of governance of projects 
(Bredillet, 2008a). Much previous research applied either agency theory or TCE concepts and 
themes (such as cost, relationships and mechanisms) to investigate “the overall and 
contractual aspects, the choice of project contracts and the forms of bilateral or trilateral 
governance to handle large-scale projects” (Söderlund, 2011, p. 163). 
We suggest that additional governance theories are also suited to explain project 
governance at various project levels. Project governance is a multi-level phenomenon at the 
intersection of projects, programs and portfolio management levels, which aids the successful 
achievement of organizational and project objectives (Müller, 2009). It is thus defined by the 
duality of successfully meeting objectives, set out by particular projects, but also by 
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acknowledging overarching organizational objectives. Stressing the effects of effective 
project governance, (Weaver, 2005) argues that project governance contributes to a firm’s 
performance as it helps to manage and minimize project risk, improve transparency between 
different organizational levels (in order to meet project objectives), and positively influences 
the exchange of relevant information across different stakeholder groups (Müller, 2009). 
However, this research is subject to limitations. One is that some influential research 
in the field of project governance may have been published in books (such as the Oxford 
Handbook of Project Management) and conference proceedings, which were not included in 
the data. Further, our analysis only included papers that used the identifier ‘project 
governance’ (wider management, engineering and IT journals) and ‘governance’ (project 
management journals) in their titles, keywords and/or abstracts. This effectively omits 
research on closely related constructs or constructs that underlie governance research in 
particular, such as the terms ‘stakeholder theory’, ‘shareholder value’ and ‘transaction cost 
economics’. Furthermore, our searches did not include keywords that may be a clear 
indication of central governance theories, such as the terms ‘principal’ and ‘transaction costs’. 
While using these keywords to create the dataset of articles published in project management 
journals, the same search would have returned many unrelated articles in the general 
management, IT and engineering journals search. However, the focus of our study was to 
analyze how project governance was specifically used in previously published research, and 
papers that did not explicitly use the term ‘(project) governance’ may not intend to be 
associated with this research field. Therefore, at this stage, it is important to acknowledge and 
refer to the rich, project-based governance literature, from which the concept of project 
governance originated in the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Clegg et al., 2002; Eccles, 1981; 
Morris, 1997; Stinchcombe, 1959). 
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Future empirical research should focus on investigating project governance with 
respect to different suggested organizational levels. Level-specific research offers the ability 
to draw context-specific conclusions and explain actions and practices, with regards to the 
roles and responsibilities of particular organizational layers Here, existing governance 
theories play a vital role, as they offer valuable starting points for level-specific 
understandings of project governance. As Hällgren (2012) outlines, project management 
research is overly concerned with gap spotting and the creation of new project management 
theories. Instead, we argue that we should explore the value of existing theories that represent 
a multi-perspective, cross-functional picture of project governance, in regards to the multi-
level nature or projects and PBOs. This would enable the field of project management to 
overcome over-specialization and fragmentation, and draw from a well-established theoretical 
corpus while remaining open to innovative and constructive ideas (Söderlund, 2011). In other 
words, project governance research should be seen as an extension of corporate governance 
theories, that can draw on a substantial body of existing theories, to create context-specific 
theories of governance in a project context while challenging basic assumptions of the 
research process. 
From a practical perspective, project governance ensures that a project is executed 
according to the standards of a particular PBO and its institution. Project governance, 
therefore, creates transparency across all project activities and across different organizational 
layers, which in turn creates accountabilities. More specifically, project governance often 
installs a project reporting system that specifically outlines roles and responsibilities for all 
stakeholders involved in the project. A good governance structure does not restrain the ability 
of project managers to act flexibly and accommodate for unexpected changes, rather, it helps 
project manages set project priorities. 
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Understanding the particular governance of a PBO and its larger objectives enables 
project managers to identify which objectives to pursue and prioritize in order to deliver a 
successful project. Certain objectives can be changes or amended that are misaligned with the 
overall strategic objectives of the PBO. A good governance structure further ensures that each 
individual project remains in alignment with the greater organizational goal of the PBO. 
Moreover, higher organizational boards (e.g., steering committees), which are often an 
essential part of organizational governance structure, can be used in a support function in 
order to solve problems or ambiguities, or adhere to institutional standards, without losing 
sight of greater strategic objectives. Hence, we can conclude that project governance is an 
important and useful aspect of delivering successful projects, which goes beyond pure 
organizational control and planning, and therefore, it should be used as an enabler of 
collaboration and reflection. 
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Table 1: Summary of central governance theories 
 
Theory  Summary Key authors 
Agency 
Theory 
Agency theory identifies an agency relationship of two parties (the 
principal and the agent) in organizations. Both actors are perceived as 
rational economic actors that act in a self-interested manner. The 
governance structure is cost and control oriented and may favor 
short-term results. 





Transaction cost economics (TCE) implies that organizations adapt 
their governance structures to achieve the lowest possible transaction 
costs. However, TCE assumes a complex relationship between buyer 






Stakeholder theory takes into account of a wider group of 
constituents rather than focusing on shareholders. Where there is an 
emphasis on stakeholders, the governance structure of the company 





The Shareholder theory of corporate governance assumes that the 
main purpose of an organization is to maximize shareholder return on 
investment (ROI). This requires structures (such as contracts, 
processes and policies) to assure managerial action is always in the 
best interests of the shareholders. 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Friedman (1962) 
Stewardship 
theory 
Stewardship theory defines a relationship between organizational 
actors, in which the managers are not motivated by individual goals, 
but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives 
of their principals.  The governance structure is built on trust to 
enhance the long-term performance of the organization. 
Donaldson (1990), 




Directors are able to prioritize, acquire, facilitate and connect the 
company’s internal and external resources needed to achieve 
corporate objectives.  





Table 2: Summary of key project governance definitions 
Author Definition 
Turner (2009, p. 311) The governance of a project involves a set of relationships between the 
project’s management, its sponsor (or executive board), its owner and 
other stakeholders. It provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the project are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. 
PMI (2013, p. 579) The alignment of project objectives with the strategy of the larger 
organization by the project sponsor and project team. A project’s 
governance is defined by and is required to fit within the larger context of 
the program or organization sponsoring it, but is separate from 
organizational governance. 
Müller (2009, p. 4) Governance, as it applies to portfolios, programs, projects, and project 
management, coexists within the corporate governance framework. It 
comprises the value system, responsibilities, processes and policies that 
allow projects to achieve organizational objectives and foster 
implementation that is in the best interests of all the stakeholders, internal 




Table 3: Overview of Papers in Project Management Journals 
Authors Title Year Journal Summary 
Too E.G., Weaver P. The management of project 
management: A conceptual framework 
for project governance 
2013 IJPM This paper examines existing research, ideas and concepts of project 
governance and enterprise project management, and offers a framework 
to build on current theory development and practice. The purpose of the 
framework described in this paper is to provide guidance to organizations 
in the development of effective project governance to optimize the 
management of projects. 
Aubry M., Richer M.-C., Lavoie-
Tremblay M. 
Governance performance in complex 
environment: The case of a major 
transformation in a university hospital 
2013 IJPM Project-based organizations have emerged as new forms of organization 
in the last few decades. However, hierarchy persists. Both serve their own 
purpose, but entail different sets of values. Findings reveal the existence 
of paradoxes between the executives and the PMO regarding the PMO 
performance and show how these paradoxes evolved over time. 
Muller R., Andersen E.S., Kvalnes O., 
Shao J., Sankaran S., Rodney Turner 
J., Biesenthal C., Walker D., Gudergan 
S. 
The interrelationship of governance, 
trust, and ethics in temporary 
organizations 
2013 PMJ This study investigates the variety of ethical decisions of project 
managers and their impact from corporate governance and project 
governance structures. The roles of personal trust and system trust as a 
mechanism to steer ethical decision making in different governance 
settings is explored. 
Ahern T., Leavy B., Byrne P.J. Complex project management as 
complex problem solving: A 
distributed knowledge management 
perspective 
2013 IJPM Central to the view of complex project management as a form of complex 
problem solving is the governance challenge of knowledge management 
under uncertainty. This paper proposes that the distributed coordination 
mechanism which both organizations evolved for this contingency can 
best be characterized as a 'common will of mutual interest', a self-
organizing process that was fostered around project goals and paced by 
the project life cycle. 
Hellstrom M., Ruuska I., Wikstrom K., 
Jafs D. 
Project governance and path creation in 
the early stages of Finnish nuclear 
power projects 
2013 IJPM This paper focuses on the early stages of projects and their governance 
implications by investigating the introduction of nuclear power in 
Finland. The paper argues that strong relationships and commitment 
create opportunities for alternative paths during project appraisal, 
increase the array of available governance mechanisms, and hence lay 
foundations for the final governance structure of the project execution 
phase. 
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Pinto J.K. Project management, governance, and 
the normalization of deviance 
2013 IJPM Using results from interviews with 21 project managers, this paper 
considers how normalization of deviance affects project management 
practices. The paper examines the role of organizational learning and 
corporate governance in identifying and minimizing the negative impact 
of normalization of deviance behaviors on project-based work. 
Nisar T.M. Implementation constraints in social 
enterprise and community Public 
Private Partnerships 
2013 IJPM This paper examines three community Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
projects to identify critical success factors of the project outcomes. The 
findings suggest the need to implement appropriate project governance 
practices including management discipline and expertise. 
Koh A., Crawford L. Portfolio management: The Australian 
experience 
2012 PMJ The increasing use of projects and programs by organizations to achieve 
business strategy and goals has led to the need for understanding project 
portfolio management. This study investigates the governance structures 
and the roles, responsibilities, and practices of portfolio managers. 
Pemsel S., Muller R. The governance of knowledge in 
project-based organizations 
2012 IJPM This research investigates patterns of knowledge governance practices in 
project-based organizations (PBOs). The results show that informal 
governance mechanisms are more useful than formal when it comes to 
knowledge creating processes. Governance of informal knowledge 
creating mechanisms appears to be complex for executives and their 
preconceptions showed either to be enablers or barriers to productive 
knowledge governance practices. 
Young R., Young M., Jordan E., 
O'Connor P. 
Is strategy being implemented through 
projects? Contrary evidence from a 
leader in New Public Management 
2012 IJPM This paper reports on the effectiveness of the project management and 
investment frameworks in the State of Victoria. It finds project 
management and investment practices comparable to best practice but 
also finds 100 billion dollars invested in projects over the past decade 
without any evidence of improvement in strategic goals. 
Tadege Shiferaw A., Jonny Klakegg 
O., Haavaldsen T. 
Governance of public investment 
projects in Ethiopia 
2012 PMJ The purpose of this article is to map and review the governance of public 
investment projects in Ethiopia and to identify the most important front-
end challenges of public investment projects in the country. The findings 
indicate that the top-down project approach, lack of mandatory control 
gateways at the front-end project preparation and decision-making stages, 
and weak links between project stakeholders, affected the effectiveness of 
the project governance system. 
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Tadege Shiferaw A., Jonny Klakegg 
O. 
Linking policies to projects: The key to 
identifying the right public investment 
projects 
2012 PMJ This article reviews the merits of project governance in linking policies to 
projects and focuses on public investment projects in African countries. It 
provides a project governance model to link policies to projects, a 
checklist for good project governance, and an outline of factors that could 
affect the project governance implementation. 
Sanderson J. Risk, uncertainty and governance in 
megaprojects: A critical discussion of 
alternative explanations 
2012 IJPM This article critically discusses different explanations for the performance 
problems exhibited by many megaprojects, and examines the proposed 
governance solutions. It proposes a three-fold typology of explanations 
and solutions by examining epistemological assumptions about decision-
maker cognition and about decision-maker views on the nature of the 
future. 
Ritson G., Johansen E., Osborne A. Successful programs wanted: 
Exploring the impact of alignment 
2012 PMJ This paper explores the development of a program management 
alignment theory. Statistical testing showed that interaction between the 
study model variables was found to be multidimensional, complex, and 
subtle in influence. Thus, the paper concludes that programs have both 
deliberate and emergent strategies requiring design and management to 
be organized as complex adaptive systems. 
Aubry M., Richer M.-C., Lavoie-
Tremblay M., Cyr G. 
Pluralism in PMO performance: The 
case of a PMO dedicated to a major 
organizational transformation 
2011 PMJ The focus of this article is on the contribution made by the project 
management office (PMO) to organizational performance, and the way it 
can be assessed. The paper particularly explores the case of a PMO 
dedicated to a major organizational transformation within a Canadian 
university hospital, and show that competing value/performance 
frameworks exist. 
London K., Siva J.P.S. The role of reflexive capability in 
relation to intellectual capital on multi 
international partnerships 
2011 IJPM This paper analysis firms' barriers and successful strategies in decision 
making in various international markets. A reflexive capability model 
developed from social sciences theory explains the way in which firms 
can develop awareness, responsiveness and adaptability for long-term 
success in diverse international markets. Results indicate that the model 
of reflexivity capability is a useful way to interpret practices that are 
undertaken in multi-partner relationships on large complex projects. 
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Marnewick C., Labuschagne L. An investigation into the governance of 
information technology projects in 
South Africa 
2011 IJPM Information technology (IT) projects are often perceived as adding little 
or no organizational value despite substantial investments being made. 
The non-adoption of governance principles might contribute to this 
perception as unfeasible projects are often approved and initiated without 
proper discourse. This article reports on the investigation of IT projects in 
South African organizations to determine whether generally accepted 
governance principles were applied in the project domain. 
Ruuska I., Ahola T., Artto K., 
Locatelli G., Mancini M. 
A new governance approach for multi-
firm projects: Lessons from Olkiluoto 3 
and Flamanville 3 nuclear power plant 
projects 
2011 IJPM We suggest that in the governance of large multi-firm projects, any of the 
prevalent governance approaches that rely on market, hierarchy, or hybrid 
forms, is not adequate as such. By doing so, this paper opens up avenues 
towards a novel theory of governance in large projects by adopting a 
project network view with multiple networked firms within a single 
project, and by simultaneously going beyond organizational forms that 
cut across the traditional firm-market dichotomy. 
Bouraad F. IT project portfolio governance: The 
emerging operation manager 
2010 PMJ This article presents a detailed analysis of available IT operations 
literature in order to identify the most appropriate competencies and 
necessary skill sets that will be needed by an operation manager for 
strategic business alignment. 
Jonas D. Empowering project portfolio 
managers: How management 
involvement impacts project portfolio 
management performance 
2010 IJPM Along with the increasing diffusion of project portfolio management a 
new managerial role evolves: the project portfolio manager. This paper 
investigates the role of the project portfolio manager and its interplay 
with line and senior management to explain how management 
involvement can positively and negatively impact project portfolio 
success at the same time. 
Williams T., Klakegg O.J., Magnussen 
O.M., Glasspool H. 
An investigation of governance 
frameworks for public projects in 
Norway and the UK 
2010 IJPM This paper describes four case studies which formed a key part of an 
investigation into public investment project governance frameworks in 
Norway and the UK. The studies looked at how the embedded 
governance principles worked out in practice, how they affected PM, and 
how consistent their effects were with their aims. Conclusion is made 
about the actual effects of the frameworks, and various areas for 
improvement or further study are highlighted. 
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Ruuska I., Artto K., Aaltonen K., 
Lehtonen P. 
Dimensions of distance in a project 
network: Exploring Olkiluoto 3 nuclear 
power plant project 
2009 IJPM This paper proposes that many of the challenges of implementing large 
multi-firm projects are captured in the multi-dimensional concept of 
distance between firms in a large project's actor network. By addressing 
projects as multi-firm enterprises with specific distance characteristics, 
our research opens up a path towards novel management of a project that 
engages several firms in its sphere of governance. 
Bredillet C.N. Learning and acting in project 
situations through a meta-method 
(MAP) a case study: Contextual and 
situational approach for project 
management governance in 
management education 
2008 IJPM The paper introduces the underlying principles and the general features of 
a meta-method (MAP method) developed as part of and used in various 
research, education and professional development programs at ESC Lille. 
This method aims at providing effective and efficient structure and 
process for acting and learning in various complex, uncertain and 
ambiguous managerial situations (projects, programs, portfolios). 
Wearne S. Stakeholders in excellence in teaching 
and learning of project management 
2008 IJPM The paper reports differences in how post-graduate and experienced 
'students', their employers and others appear to value and therefore may 
judge the excellence of teaching of project management. Stakeholders 
can see excellence from unexpected value obtained from courses. The 
teachers and all concerned when promoting and selecting teaching of 
project management should therefore consider together what should be 
expected and what could be obtained from what they think is needed and 
what can be provided. 
Thiry M., Deguire M. Recent developments in project-based 
organisations 
2007 IJPM Project-based organizations (PBO) refer to a variety of organizational 
forms that involve the creation of temporary systems for the performance 
of project tasks.  This paper argues that an important aspect of PBOs is 
yet unexplored and lies in the development of a collaborative relationship 
between the fields of project and general management and the importance 
of developing a common language that fosters dialogue. 
Chang C.-Y., Ive G. The hold-up problem in the 
management of construction projects: 
A case study of the Channel Tunnel 
2007 IJPM The hold-up problem in the presence of asset specificity poses great 
transaction hazards. Therefore, having a sound understanding of this 
problem is an important managerial issue. The purpose of this research is 
to apply the perspective of transaction cost economics (TCE) to the 
analysis of three major disputes that arose in the Channel Tunnel project 
during 1988-94. 
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Devapriya K.A.K. Governance issues in financing of 
public-private partnership organisations 
in network infrastructure industries 
2006 IJPM Public-private partnership (PPP) organizational approaches to generation, 
management and operation of network infrastructure and services have 
widely followed competitive market forms under different regulatory 
regimes. Managerial decisions on financing of PPP companies have been 
governed by regulatory markets with unstable institutions in developing 
and emerging economies. This paper reveals that debt has not been an 
effective mechanism to control managers' behavior since subordinate 
financing also functions to address debt agency in the capital structure of 
those regulated PPP organizations. 
Abednego M.P., Ogunlana S.O. Good project governance for proper 
risk allocation in public-private 
partnerships in Indonesia 
2006 IJPM Parties that are involved in an infrastructure project under public-private 
partnership (PPP) procurement system typically have different 
perceptions of proper risk allocation. This research is conducted to 
discover the perception of proper risk allocation of each party involved 
and utilizes the findings as the foundation to develop the concept of good 
project governance. 
Clifton C., Duffield C.F. Improved PFI/PPP service outcomes 
through the integration of Alliance 
principles 
2006 IJPM This paper explores management and governance of private finance 
initiatives/public private partnership (PFI/PPP) projects via the 
integration of Alliance concepts into the typical concession agreements. 
In this context, appropriate governance is defined as achieving and 
improving long-term service outcomes. This paper presents the findings 
of a study that has investigated aspects of contract structure, risk 
management and those features of concession agreements that drive 
service behavior. 
Jerzy Henisz W.(V.) Governance issues in public private 
partnerships 
2006 IJPM Academic research has increasingly shifted from debating the relative 
efficacy of state- and private-ownership to a comparative institutional 
approach that seeks to identify the relative costs and competencies of 
these governance forms to deal with particular hazards in specific 
transactions. Recent research, including the 10 articles included in this 
special issue, expands upon this insight to explore not only the polar 
cases of state- and private-ownership but also hybrid or alliance forms of 
governance. 
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Fischer K., Jungbecker A., Alfen H.W. The emergence of PPP Task Forces and 
their influence on project delivery in 
Germany 
2006 IJPM The paper aims at revealing why institutions like public-private 
partnership (PPP) Task Forces have an impact on the realization of PPP 
projects and the achievement of Value for Money in PPPs. The paper 
highlights the impact of Task Forces on the implementation of PPP 
projects in Germany and features their influence on the procurement 
process and the achievement of Value for Money. 
Holmes J., Capper G., Hudson G. Public Private Partnerships in the 
provision of health care premises in the 
UK 
2006 IJPM This paper presents a study of the Local Improvement Finance Trusts 
(LIFTs) that are being used to procure new health care premises 
throughout the UK. In terms of governance, the procurement process was 
extended to later phases before full evaluations of the schemes had been 
undertaken. Findings further show the additional cost of premises 
procured in the above manner and the ability of the scheme to meet the 
government's objectives in the later phases. 
Turner J.R. Towards a theory of project 
management: The nature of the project 
governance and project management 
2006 IJPM In multiple editorials, Turner develops a theory of project management. 
Through a series of premises and dilemmas he attempts to derive a 
structure of project management, and identify inherent elements of 
project management. In that last issue, I looked at the nature of projects 
and identified two premises and five lemmas, eight inherent elements of 
project management and four roles, including the role of governance in 
projects. 
Reve T., Levitt R.E. Organization and governance in 
construction 
1984 IJPM Transaction cost analysis provides a viable theoretical perspective for the 
study of organization and governance in construction. The trilateral 
governance of a client, engineering consultant, and contractors commonly 
observed in industrial construction projects is detailed. The implications 
of a professional relationship between the client and the consultant and a 
clan-type relationship between the consultant and the contractors are 
discussed within the context of large construction projects. !
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Table 4: Overview of different levels of project governance and proposed theories 
 
Governance … Project level PMO level Organizational level 
… Objectives Governance of individual 
project 
Linking projects to 
organizational objectives 




• Project management 
• Project delivery 
• Manage objectives, 
expectations and 
outcomes 
• Portfolio and 
program management 
• Developing PM 
capabilities 
• Project evaluation 
• Portfolio direction 
• Project sponsorship 
• Disclosure and reporting 
Performance • Tactical  
• Short-term 
(temporary) 
• Goal directed 
• Operational 




• Strategic  
• Long-term (permanent) 
• Competitive advantage 
Governance 
Theories  
• Agency Theory 





• Stewardship Theory 
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